The conflict by dint of forth Ali?s reign among himself and Muawiya was purportedly referable to his reluctance and decision non to find and visit Uthman?s killers, and whence regarded as an indirect accomplice in the murder. This seemed to be equal author for Muawiya not to pay devotion to him, as it was his employment as an Arab chieftain to avenge Uthman?s finish . all the same, historians such(prenominal) as Kennedy, tend to agree with the Shia view, ?treating this guide as a purposeless pretext for his actions.? The Shia especially tends to get down and humiliate Muawiya, vilifying him for his op place to Ali out of sheer motivation for agent and placement . provided Shia and Sunni historians tend to be biased on their views of Muawiya, thus diminishes their dependableness and proper judgement on his geek and rule. Sources and historic association on his life and c beer are actually meagre and of his inner motives and purposes we know even less. comm on consensus among historians, although a simple one, states that the master(prenominal) reason behind Muawiya?s rebellion once mo symmetricalness Ali was retaliation for Uthman. While it may be comprehend as clean that, only a few defecate managed to delve deeper into the be reasons behind Muawiya?s actions. slightly traditionists such as al-Jurjani, Baladhuri and Awana film a totally different outlook, eliminating Muawiya and economiseing that Amr b. al-As was the one who initiated and organized the fermenting and combats against Ali in Syria. Amr was a cheat political genius, who was as good as behind the arbitration that deposed Ali, and thus possible that he was the brains behind Muawiya. Other views re-examine the revolt against Uthman. some(prenominal) reports impeach Muawiya of perceptual experience the imminent catastrophe and exploiting it for his own self-serving ends and ?began scheming and desired Uthman?s killing so as to succeed him as caliph? while oppositewises showed him in a favou! rable lighting ? removeing he came to Uthman?s appeals as short as he solidised how serious the situation was only was plainly too ripe. check to Madelung, ?Uthman had meant elflike to him; he had through nothing to aid him and matt-up no personal liability to search revenge.? From this evidence and Muawiya?s deliberate delay for Uthman?s appeals for help, it is thus conflicting with his reason for opposing Ali - blood retri only whenion; this was in fact a great ?political good? for his own secular ambitions and just a way to meet his Umayyad kinsmen who look to him for leadership and to nullify alienation. This claim is further back up since his launch for vengeance in Syria was only by and by the conflict of the Camel, sixer months or more afterward Uthman?s murder. coincidently after the first civil war, which further stained Ali?s frame as caliph, Muawiya needed that a Shura be set up for the purpose of nominating an untarnished caliph. If he was so k een to try out revenge, why did he wait that long? Instead, the difficult assign he was in had spurred him into action. Ali had dismissed most of the provincial governors organize by his predecessor to reward his behaveers for their services however, Muawiya on the other hand had built a strong local magnate base in Syria and ref apply ?to be dismissed with ease or to stand by and see Uthman?s work undone.? at one time Ali?s presence in Iraq and Qays b. Sads unsteady control of Egypt expose him and Syria to potential attack from two fronts. as yet if Muawiya had accepted the nemesis of allegiance to Ali, Ali would have certainly used his authority to contract him from his position as governor of Syria; so might as well not give his allegiance and use the demand for blood vengeance as a tool to berate rebellion against Ali and secure his h sometime(a) on Syria. Thus he stepped up his propaganda against Ali and hoped to draw the governor of Egypt to his side, by threa ts and promises. His closing to carry on in great! queen alternatively then genuinely desire revenge for Uthman reflects his ungenerous character and his unlawful tactics against Ali swear his position as one of personal gain. Keeping to that point, ?It has been suggested that the competitor amidst Ali and Muawiya entailed some point in time of territorial competition between Iraq and Syria.? This suggestion was supported by Hitti, stating ?The issue however, was more than a personal one; it transcended singular and even family affairs. The real incredulity was whether Kufa or Damascus, Iraq or Syria, should be supreme in Islamic affairs.? A victory for Muawiya?s army would mean Syrian domination over the rest of the empire, supporting his claim for caliphate and again another example of his lust for power. Some historians state the real aim of Muawiyah was to create difficulties in the way of Ali in exhibition to pave the way for the air of power to the Umayyads. The conflict between Ali and Muawiyah was really the recurrence of the old rivalry between the Hashimites and the Umayyads, who ?believed that the caliphate had through Uthman be arrange ?their property?.? still this aim was unlikely the main reason of conflict but alternatively served as an bonus for the members of each clan to fight. again power always seems to be the motive; the new Arab purification the Prophet had strived for is gradually retroversion back to their old Bedouin ways. other reason for Muawiya?s resistivity against Ali was the effects it would have if he had paid allegiance. As stated by Humphreys: ?the acknowledgment that Ali had come to power in a justifiedlyful manner, that there were no other legitimate claimants for the station of caliph?? Muawiya could not establish for these effects to take plant, as he will a good deal lose all his power and status. In fact, Ali?s assigning to caliph lacked legitimacy. Although his close family relationship with the Prophet and merits for Islam seemed enou gh for his claim, ?He was not chosen by a Shura, whic! h Umar had stipulated as a condition for valid succession.? but doubts surround whether his attitude towards Uthman?s murder permit him to fill the caliphate. Despite that, throughout the effort of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, Muawiya had ?make no claims of his own? until later on, concentrating world-class on his position as governor of Syria and waiting until Ali compromised himself by his conduct before interfere in the course of events . Muawiya had no claim or the support needed to aspire for the caliphate and his status as a late and ?convenient? convert without archaeozoic merit in Islam did not help him. The disintegration of Ali?s caliphate was then ascribed to ?Kharijite opposition instead to his activities, which was sacredly unlawful? although he was the one who started the chain reaction which led to these events. His vengeance for Uthman and determination to commemorate his governorship led to the Battle of Siffin, which led to the arbitration, whi ch dimened Ali?s position and then Muawiya ?openly asserted his claims to the caliphate.? All the right pieces had suitably fell into place to strengthen his claim to the caliphate and congratulations has to be given to him for his political shrewdness, moderation and self-control. There is little diachronic evidence to subsume Muawiya with the deaths of Hassan and Husayn. Although Muawiya had made a pecuniary agreement with Hassan not to claim his caliphate, people today, mainly Shia, up to now implicate him with his death, claiming that he was ? possibly acerbateed because of some harem intrigue.? Some early Arab historians believe that Muawiya made many plans and arrangements to kill Hassan . It was verbalise that he secretly contacted Hassan?s wife Ja?da bint al-Ash?arh ibn Qays and instigated her to poison her husband, promising gold and mating to Yazid in return . However it is unlikely that Muawiya would benefit in any way by killing Hassan. Hassan proved to be no threat to his caliphate and had no political involvem! ent at all. Because of the lack of substantial evidence, it is good to conclude that Hassan?s death was not connected to Muawiya?s personal motives against Ali. The same could be said for Husayn?s death; Muawiya had already passed absent and the focus has shifted to his son, Yazid I. Some weak sources claim that Muawiya had promised Husayn the Caliphate after his death.
Here, it can only be assumed that he cherished to keep the power in his family and the Umayyads, and it?s possible that there might still be some personal blood feud against Ali, thus he went back on his word and set up the entryway of his son, Yazid I a nd indirectly played a give out in Husayn?s death. Muawiya?s nomination of Yazid caused a stir in the Muslim community, those opposing the plan, quickly ? impeach Muawiya of attempting to set up a hereditary monarchy.? It also brought stuffy speculation of Muawiya?s Islamic dedicate and its ideals. However, he belike realised the flaws of a democratic caliphate and sensed that a monarchy would be the best way forward for the Muslims, considering the fact that the Arabs supported the desire during the issue of succession of the Prophet in the case of Ali. Armstrong though states that he ?de get out from Arab traditions in order to secure the succession.? Weiss and super acid rebuke this statement, believing that ?even in this matter Muawiya showed pry to Arab sensitivities. Rather than imposing the dynastic principle upon tribal leaders, he secured from them an oath of allegiance for his son, thus basing the succession upon their consent rather than upon any legitimate right of his household.? The principle of succession! by election was thereby honored, while the caliphate actually passed from father to son. Muawiya had frame a loophole though this system and consequently created a impostor for a de facto dynasty. But considering Yazid?s character, ?an absolute playboy? , the spectral quality of the caliph has taken a back bottomland to the politics, therefore also reflecting Muawiya?s religious grounding and proves that his intentions were to keep the Umayyads in power. Muawiya?s actions throughout his career demonstrate that ?his virtues were those of the fetching politician, not of the brilliant general or the religious leader.? about(predicate) historians, such as Kennedy, Armstrong, and Peterson etc. agree that Muawiya was problematic in religious context, stating that he is far from ideal and ? scrupulously downcast? . According to Humphreys, ?In formal piety and personal conduct, he was acceptable enough (at least he provoked no public scandal) but he was never regarded as reli giously learned or even thoughtful and engaged, beyond a superficial level. He believed in God and was publicly coiffure in his observances but no more.? His lack of Islamic practise could be confirmed in his actions and decisions. Religiously unlawful activities and get ahead methods of gaining power and status against Ali establish his disregard and failure to harbor to simple Islamic principles, ideals, the Quran and Hadith. In conclusion, although Muawiya was a go in of the conflicts and anxieties that afflicted the Ummah, he is decisive political figure in the history of Islam. Muawiya was ?literally the only man with political and array resources available to restore unity? , despite lacking a religious moral ground. Even though he restored peace, he had deliberately provoked and been a major protagonist in the civil war that disunited them in the first place. Whilst historical evidence on his personal thoughts and intentions are not solid, it is homy though that his ascension to caliph and power was ultimately pa! rt due to his own machinations. Bibliography:1.Armstrong, Karen, Islam: A Short muniment, Phoenix Press, London, 20022.Hawting, G. R., The point of al-Tabari Volume XVII The First Civil War, New York Press, USA, 19963.Hitti, Phillip K., story of the Arabs, Macmillan, New York, 20024.Humphreys, Stephen R., Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan ? From Arabia to Empire, Oneworld Pubns Ltd, 20065.Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain, 20046.Madelung, Wilferd, The winning over to Muhammad ? A Study of primaeval Caliphate7.Petersen, Erling Ladewig, Ali and Muawiya in Early Arabic Tradition, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 19648.Weiss, Bernard G. and Green, Arnold H., A Survey of Arab history, Cairo, Cairo Press, Amer. Univ., 1990 i moldiness say, this essay is very good overall. Has many sources to back up the author and also has looked at the situation from both sides. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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